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WILL THE REAL CIVIL SOCIETY ADVOCATES PLEASE
STAND UP?
JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN*

Civil society is in the air. Much of the energy and impetus for
this renewed interest in civil society can be traced to the remarkable
events leading to the collapse of the oppressive Soviet system in 1989.

Why is that? Because so many leaders of the dissident movements in
Central Eastern Europe had, for years, been writing about civil
society as what they lacked and what they aspired to. Vaclav Havel,
most eloquent among the civil society thinkers to come out of Central
Eastern Europe, argued that the nature of the authoritarian state

apparatuses set up in all Soviet client states was designed explicitly to
destroy the possibilities for independent self-constitution in and
through solidarity with others. In a number of remarkable essays, he
called for a new birth of freedom made possible when citizens act
together toward common ends.'
Echoes of the doctrine of
subsidiarity, central to Catholic Social Thought, also sounded-

indeed, the freedom movement in Poland was called, simply,
"Solidarity" - the heart of the idea of human civic life in the
subsidiarity ideal being that the state is there to serve civil society, not
to dominate over it.
When I first discovered Havel's writings sometime in the mid1970s, I picked up immediately the connection to two other great
thinkers-Alexis de Tocqueville and Hannah Arendt. Tocqueville's

observations, in his classic work Democracy in America, concerning
the civic enthusiasm of the Americans and their penchant for forming
associations to further a variety of ends, relying on already extant
* Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics, University of
Chicago; Chair of the Council on Civil Society. The author wishes to thank Professors Macedo,
Tushnet, Rosenblum, and Etzioni for their thoughtful and independent contributions to the civil
society debate. Although I have some disagreements, I will not be able to address them in this
response. But their essays stand as part and parcel of the civil society debate, as does the long
essay by Professors McClain and Fleming, although I will air a number of points at which we
differ. By contrast, the essays by Professors Fineman and Roberts strike me as a reaction
against the ideal of civil society, which demands far more trust in the capacities of ordinary
citizens to order their affairs than Fineman and Roberts seem prepared to grant. What is at
stake as well is the understanding of self that moves through these contributions respectively.
1. See generally VACLAV HAVEL, OPEN LETTERS: SELECTED WRITINGS (1991).
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forms of membership-particularly in churches; 2 and Hannah
Arendt's distinction between power as dominion or rule and power as
a "something" that comes into being when citizens come to know and
to enact a good in common that they cannot know alone are civil
society ideas.3 To that, one must add the vital importance of a moral
dimension to civil society advocacy. Any discussion of human dignity,
purposes, and vitality; or any lament, therefore, of systems that crush
human aspirations, trample on human dignity, and violate
fundamental rights is a moral discussion.
America, of course, has her own great exemplars of the moral
voice in politics. Some were involved directly in the creation or
extension of civil society. One thinks of Abraham Lincoln's
insistence that one simply could not talk about the issue of the spread
of slavery-the reference point here being his debates with Stephen
Douglas-without criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Dred
Scott v. Sanford.4 The imagery and prophetic language of the great
Second Inaugural Address is most instructive, of course, of Lincoln's
indebtedness to strong notions that the nations (and therefore
politics) are not independent in all things-that, indeed, they are
under Divine judgement. Moving to the twentieth century, one can
observe such great democratic exemplars as Jane Addams, Eleanor
Roosevelt and Martin Luther King-all builders of civil society; all
moral leaders. The lives and work of each is unthinkable absent his
or her embrace of a strenuous set of moral norms and principles.
Consider Eleanor Roosevelt's insistence in her 1940 book, The Moral
Basis of Politics, that American democracy had its "roots in religious
belief"5 and that the only hope for our future lay in basing democracy
"on the Christian way of life," by which she meant full recognition of
the claims made in behalf of stewardship and neighborly love.6
All of this makes us uncomfortable nowadays for some good
reasons and some that are not so good. The good reason is that we
are concerned with excluding anyone from civic life and civic dialogue
on the basis of doctrinal differences. We hope that those who bring
religious beliefs to the public square will do so in a language to which
all citizens have access-a language of the common good, for
2- See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA (J.P. Mayer ed. &

George Lawrence trans., 1969).
3. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958).
4. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
5.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, THE MORAL BASIS OF DEMOCRACY 42 (1940).

6. Id. at 81-82.
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example, or the intrinsic dignity of all persons. This, certainly, was
the tack we took in the Council on Civil Society with our claim in A
7
Call to Civil Society that democracy "depends on moral truths.
There is something odd about the need for this reminder, but it struck
us that in a day and age in which a kind of all-knowing skepticism is
skeptical about everything but skepticism-the not so good reason to
be wary of a moral voice in politics-it is important to remind
ourselves that, among the moral truths on which democracy depends,
primus inter pares is surely the "truth that all persons possess equal
dignity."8 We went on to add that civil society is a way we embody
and discover the truth that we are "intrinsically social beings" and
that our participation in civil society in a democracy is a way of living
that "calls us fully to pursue, live out, and transmit moral truth." 9 The
most important, again, being an affirmation of the status of persons
such that no one is to be treated arbitrarily or capriciously, no one
slated simply to be the means to someone else's end.
This would not seem to be particularly controversial but,
apparently, the diverse group of Americans who signed A Call to
Civil Society did not reckon with the sorts of responses, even rather
heated responses, that any notion of a moral dimension to civil
renewal and political life seems to generate nowadays. In several of
the essays in this issue, those tagged "civil society revivalists"10-a
locution I find problematic-are charged with, and found guilty of, a
number of things, including "nostalgic longing for the vibrant civil
society that Alexis de Tocqueville observed in America in the
1830s ...which excluded entire categories of persons from
membership in civil society and from equal citizenship in the polity.""1
As if that were not bad enough, this gaggle of "revivalists" are
accused of being the bearers of coercive bad tidings; being blind to
"abuse and violence 1 2 within marriage; and being blas6 about
"growing inequality."1' 3 The piece de resistance is surely the charge
that revivalists are bogus Santa Clauses, turning up with "gifts
7. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS
MORAL TRUTHS 27 (1998).
& Id.
9. Id.
10. Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questionsfor Civil Society Revivalists, 75
CH-KENT L.REV. 301,301 (2000).
11. Id. at 307-08.
12. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Family in Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 531,
544 (2000).
13. Id. at 544-45.
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wrapped nicely in beautiful paper and tied with pretty ribbons....
But when they [children] open up the lovely package, the children
discover to their horror that it is filled with coals."'1 4 In addition,
despite the fact that the Council on Civil Society included in its ranks
distinguished African-American scholars and activists, we (I speak as
Chair of the group) are allegedly blind to "systemic injustice,"
particularly if its roots lie in racial discrimination. 15 There are also
lurking suspicions that civil society "revivalists" are amnesiacs par
excellence, forgetting that the Western intellectual inheritance
included "scientific racism," among other horrors, thereby suggesting
(not so subtly) that the "revivalists" are tacitly allowing such toxic
arguments to go blithely unanswered. 16 I do not recognize these socalled "revivalists," particularly since I myself have warned against
seeing civil society as a "cure-all."' 7
Let me turn first to the essay by Professors McClain and
Fleming, as it is the most thoughtful of the essays to which I am
taking, in their case, only partial exception. It is indeed unfortunate
that the readers of this symposium will not have available to them the
texts of A Call to Civil Society18 and A Nation of Spectators'9 as this
would help the reader to sort out things more clearly. But that, alas,
is not to be, so we will just have to slog along without the benefit of
the primary texts ready-to-hand. Let me try to be as clear as I can
about what I take A Call to Civil Society to be calling for. Let me
clarify, first, why I take exception to the characterization "revivalist"
for those of us on the front lines of the civil society debate. As
anyone attuned to ordinary language and usage in contemporary
14. Dorothy Roberts, The Moral Exclusivity of the New Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L.

REv. 555, 555 (2000).
15. Id. at 556. The African-American scholars and activists among the 24 signatories of the
Call to Civil Society are: Enola Aird, activist mother; Ray Hammond, Pastor of Bethel AME
Church in Jamaica Plains, Massachusetts; and Cornel West, Professor of Philosophy of Religion
and Afro-American Studies at Harvard University.
16. Id. at 564.
17. See generally Jean Bethke Elshtain, Not a Cure All, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1997, at 13,
13-15. Astonishingly, this warning against seeing in civil society a kind of magic bullet to solve all
our problems also earns me the ire of Professor Roberts who claims that my article was about
dismissing "concern about social problems." Roberts, supra note 14, at 562. This is a willful
misreading. My essay was an attempt to dispel the utopian haze surrounding civil society
advocacy. To insist that civil society is not primarily problem-oriented (the cure-all idea) but
citizenship creating, thereby helping to establish the pre-conditions that make possible problemsolving through politics, seems to elude Ms. Roberts, who reads everything through an
ideological lens.
18. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 7.
19. NATIONAL COMM'N ON Civic RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: How CivIc
DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (1998).
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America will recognize immediately, "revivalism" suggests tent
meetings and what, at least from the point of view of the academy,
looks like runaway and thoughtless emotionalism. A "revivalist" is
not something any self-respecting academic would want to be labeled.
Why not simply speak of civic renewal? This problem is deepened
when McClain and Fleming speak of "moral revivalists" ° as one
variant on the generic civic revivalism theme. If civil society
revivalism is suspect, in certain ways, moral revivalism is really a
worry-again given the image it conjures up immediately of
something on the verge of being out of control and certainly not
under the proper command of rational understanding. This casts an
aura of suspicion over the whole enterprise, much compounded by
the whiff of nostalgia McClain and Fleming detect wafting through
the air rather like the scent of magnolia blossoms on a soft summer
evening in the south.
I have pondered a bit the use of the term "nostalgia" as a way to
cast a pall of suspicion over an enterprise. The word, I fear, has
become something of an all-purpose putdown. Is there no way one
can call up or call upon examples of some worthy event or person
from history as embodying a challenge or an example worth
emulating for today? How would or could one do that and avoid the
charge of "nostalgia?" My hunch is that what underlies the label of
"nostalgia" as one applies it to the ideas of another-one would likely
not call oneself in thrall to nostalgia-is the tacit embrace of a
teleology of history still indebted to the rationalist-progressivist
thinking of the nineteenth century (progressivist in the sense that
history has some sure and certain forward motion). If the twentieth
century with its grotesque body count has not disabused one of such a
confident notion, probably nothing will.
Certainly there is nothing in A Call to Civil Society that indicates
anyone wants a revival of the precise mapping of Tocquevillian
society! To the contrary: there is a good bit to indicate, in no
uncertain terms, that calling upon Tocqueville is recalling a profound
ethnographer who helped us to understand the dynamics and
formation of civil society and the many ways in which it links people
to one another and, in and through networks and associations, to
government. Tocqueville was interested in what helps people to be
strong and concerned with what weakens citizens, those caught up in
20. McClain & Fleming, supra note 10, at 303-05, 309-10, 312-13, 322, 324-25, 329, 333, 34345, 350, 352.
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the terrible denouement of civil society he called "democratic
despotism" in a number of memorable passages.2 I am also reminded
here that many of the brave dissidents that worked to create a regime
of ordered liberty with protection for basic civil rights in Central
Eastern Europe were charged by those who wanted to maintain the
oppressive authoritarian system with bourgeois romantic yearnings
for some order that never existed or never should exist. One person's
charge of nostalgia is another's dream of freedom and justice.
So let me try to be clear about what the documents at issue say
about inclusion and tolerance. In the opening salvos of A Call to Civil
Society, the Council on Civil Society asks: "Are we likely to sustain
our commitment to freedom and justice for all, so that those in our
midst who are suffering might yet be lifted up by our democratic faith
and practice?"' ' Or:
When citizens worry about "moral decline," what do they mean?
Do they want, as we so often hear, to "roll back the clock?" Return
to the 1950s? Reverse the gains made by women and minorities?
No. Racism and sexism remain serious problems in our
society. Yet with each passing year, Americans express growing
intolerance for segregation, bigotry, prejudice against minorities, or
restricting opportunities for women in public life. Despite
widespread concern about our moral condition, there is little desire
to "go back" to some earlier era.23
Sometimes words actually mean what they say and in this
instance, over a two-year period of debating, drafting, and re-drafting,
the members of the Council on Civil Society never once-as a group
or as individuals -suggested that there had not been significant
progress in the fraught areas of race relations, gender, and so on, nor
believed that this progress was sufficient unto itself. Moreover, A
Call to Civil Society is not at all an appeal to citizens to refrain from
exercising and affirming rights but, rather, a critical scrutiny of "rights
claims."
Is a collective Victorian swoon every time someone
mentions a "right" the way for critical, skeptical, yet committed
thinkers and citizens to go? I trust not. Rights need to be
distinguished from mere wants and preferences, and priorities need to
be established-questions of whether some rights are fundamental,
serving as the ground for others, must be assayed. This is the
direction civil society proponents are moving, rather than in either an
21. See generallyTocQuEvILLE, supra note 2, at 690-95.
22. COUNCIL ON CvIL SOC'y, supra note 7, at 3.

23. Id. at 5.
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automatic affirmation (from one side of the political spectrum) or
negation (from the other) of everything now grouped under the
rubric of rights. Surely, we are not obliged to affirm proclaimed
rights that might well make a mockery of real rights. A Call to Civil
Society laments the by-now well-documented "unraveling of many
aspects of civic engagement and voluntary association" and does so in
24
the interest of thinking about how good citizens come into being. It
is hard to understand how this concern implicates A Call to Civil
5
Society in shirking civic matters, as McClain and Fleming suggest.
McClain and Fleming are quite right to insist that attention must
be paid to the types of associations out there in civil society and not
just to the mere existence of associations as such. The ideal
association is certainly not Tony Soprano and his crime "family,"
white supremacist groups or violent gangs. Civil society advocates
need to be prepared to set forth the criteria under which some kinds
of associations are found worthy of endorsement and affirmation as
part of a well functioning civil society, and which groups, by contrast,
run counter to that ideal. Here again, the affirmation of the dignity of
persons is central. A careful reading of A Call to Civil Society
demonstrates that we believe one cannot escape the fundamental
ontological and anthropological presuppositions that undergird the
whole and are spelled out, not hinted at in some obscure way. The
fundamental proposition is one about "the human person," and we
take a firm stand on behalf of the dignity of persons, a dignity
incompatible with groups that are by definition committed to bigotry
and violence. We talk about the conditions for "human flourishing" 2
as a normative claim and a civic aim, and the burden of the argument
is about creating these conditions. More succinctly, to lift up the
intrinsic dignity of human persons and to call for conditions optimal
for human flourishing is always a critique of racist and exclusionary
claims.
A bit of what we propose to this end includes reorienting public
policies and social problem-solving to a new model that favors
"decentralized structures of authority and a rich diversity of
approaches." 7 We support "efforts aimed at community empowerment and community organizing-efforts that, in some of our
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id at 6.
See McClain & Fleming, supranote 10, at 307-09.
COUNCIL ON CivIL soc'Y, supra note 7, at 15.
ld. at 18.
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nation's poorer and more marginalized communities, are developing
new local leaders and rebuilding society. '28 We call for "supporting
parents in the day-to-day work of raising their children"; "charitable
choice" legislation favored by all major candidates for the presidency
and both parties; and we urge reformation but not abolition of what is
usually called Affirmative Action, arguing for a "developmental"
approach that
focuses on special opportunities for performance enhancement
among minority and lower-income students and employees.... The
civil society purpose of this form of affirmative action is simple and
urgent: racial reconciliation and reaching out with generosity
toward what is often called the "underclass," or those of our
fellow
29
citizens who are most in need of justice and civil friendship.
This brings us to some basic concerns about men, women,
children, and families. McClain and Fleming seem ready to sign on
with-certainly they do not object to-the notion attributed to some
feminists that "fatherless families might seem to offer an alternative
to patriarchy." 3 Here, some consideration of the mountains of
available empirical evidence that shows the systems-wide or macroeffects of fatherlessness, especially for male children, is in order. A
definition of what one means in the early twenty-first century by
"patriarchy" would also be helpful. Use of the word does not create
the phenomenon and whatever tattered remnants of a historic
patriarchy-and historic patriarchy is, quite literally, rule of the
fathers-that is not our situation today. Today, in fact, we face, if
anything, a growing dilemma, even crisis, among young men who are
told increasingly that they are not needed, not wanted and may as
well pack their bags and - quite literally - leave home. The centuriesold and laborious moralization of the male role-not to mention the
generous feminist vision of drawing men and women working
together as help-meets in the tasks of parenting and work-falls by
the wayside if one endorses, despite all the evidence of the baneful
effects of this reality, a symptom of contemporary disorder that
disconnects men from the tasks of nurturance and care as the wave of
the future. Further, McClain and Fleming's support of Martha
Fineman's notion that the mother-child dyad should be the "model"
for families-as opposed to men, women, and children-and that this
model alone should be subsidized indicates a willingness to entertain
2& Id. at 20.
29. Id. at 26.
30. McClain & Fleming, supra note 10, at 334-35.
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further the possibility that men can just take a hike.', Here, an
interesting difference between McClain and Fleming and the signers
of A Call to Civil Society -as well as a number of signers who have
authored independently important work on family life, public policy,
political theory, law, and so on-emerges. Picking up on what is
surely one of the weakest points in John Rawls' great work, McClain
and Fleming quote Rawls as follows: "no particular form of the
family.., is required by a political conception of justice so long as the
family is arranged to fulfill these tasks [of social reproduction]
effectively and doesn't run afoul of other political values. ' 32 From
this Rawlsian stance, McClain and Fleming go on to embrace a
"functional approach to family policy" as "more inclusive" and
therefore preferable.33
But there are serious problems with the functionalist approach to
family life, a matter that has been taken up for years by scholars of
the family. I will note a few of the problems associated with
functionalism and then go on to explain why Rawls' omission of a
substantive account of moral development is a serious lacuna in his
argument, one repeated, therefore, by McClain and Fleming.
Functionalist treatments of family life are flat-footed when it comes
to consideration of the ethical, biological or embodied, and even
sacral dimensions of human life, focusing almost exclusively on
"socialization," or what Talcott Parsons, the chief theoretician of
functionalism, called "systems maintenance." 34 The notion that
families are, in effect, obliged to shift their organization depending on
shifts in the macro-order received its definitive mapping in Parsons'
work.35 The family is obliged to mesh with the wider macro-order; as
31. See id. Often this celebration of the mother-child dyad as a benign connection by
contrast to the malign relations between men and women or men and children winds up
diabolizing male-female relations and idolatrizing female-child relations as if the latter is wholly
benign and the model for everything exemplary. Surely it is a bit too late in the day for this sort
of romanticism. Maternal practice includes a big share of frustration, resentment, anger,
manipulation, and control and is never exempt, as a human activity, from its share in what St.
Augustine called the libido dominandi. Women, after all, are the prime abusers of children, not
men, and this sorry fact surely flows from a mother-child "unit" bereft in all too many instances
of additional pairs of caring hands: that is what help-meets are for. If care helps to humanize us
and to instill the impetus to care in the young, what sort of feminist ideal, other than an
incoherent one, can it possibly be to see as an ideal disconnecting men from this primary
activity.
32. Id. at 331 (quoting John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 765,788 (1997)).
33. Id.
34. See generally Talcott Parsons, The Family in Urban IndustrialAmerica, in SOCIOLOGY
OF THE FAMILY 43-62 (Michael Anderson ed., 1971).
35. See id.
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it mutates, family life is more or less bound to do so as well. The
functionalist model holds that families historically shed one function
after another, becoming more specialized as they do so. The current
function is social reproduction-turning out men and women to take
their place in the overall social order. Parsons was quite clear that
"socializing agents should not themselves be too completely
immersed in family ties" because too strong of a commitment to the
family would handicap such persons in their ability to "fit" with the
36
needs and demands of a mobile, opportunistic society.
Construing the family in functionalist terms deprives scholars of
any normative stance from which to evaluate what is happening to
families so long as the abstract "needs" of the overall social order are
served. The importance of parenting to the well-being of flesh and
blood children-rather than the abstract needs of an abstract
construed social order-are slighted under the functionalist approach.
It is easy, therefore, to accept any changes that appear in family
norms, including the rise in divorce, say, as just the latest variation in
a family's endless mutability given the demands of social life. This, in
turn, invites the notion that so long as a "role" is being served, it
scarcely matters who occupies it. This perspective led some to
advocate doing away with the unpredictable messiness of families
altogether in favor of some more streamlined way to "socialize."
Rawls gives no account of moral development, but he does
privilege, like Parsons, the "needs" of the "macro-order" with his
insistence that whatever "effectively" serves social reproduction is
just fine. In addition, "effectively" is defined top-down: the family
must mesh with dominant political values. Here, Rawls, and those
who follow this formulation, miss an abiding irony in liberal
democratic societies, namely, that such societies have depended
historically on institutions that liberal political philosophy can neither
adequately thematize, understand, nor nurture. Families cannot be
organized on a model of a political caucus or of a macro-order notion
of what justice demands or requires. Lessons of fairness and equity
emerge in a context of relations in which, by definition, parents must
have authority in relation to their children-precisely so that children,
over time, can grow up to be responsible adults.
There is a much longer debate here than I can enter upon in a
brief response, but I do want to note that one staple of socialdemocractic argumentation in the 1970s, when I first entered the lists
36. Id. at 59.
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in these discussions, was that the existence of institutions that are not
organized like political democracies is absolutely essential to the
functioning of democracy for at least two reasons. The first being the
centrality of the moral formation of the young: what we know about
that formation tells us that stability, continuity, predictability,
nurture, discipline and an emotionally rich and complex family life
are the best

assurances-not

guarantees-that

we

have

that

formation will go forward. The second reason is that democracy,
certainly our democracy, is based in important part on social
pluralism. We are a society dotted with a variety of networks,
associations, institutions, and organizations. The Rawlsian derived
position that McClain and Fineman endorse comes perilously close to
what I call liberal monism, namely, the insistence that all institutions
internal to a democratic society must be ordered homologously with
analogous structures of authority, representation, and so on. If you
push too far in this direction, you destroy pluralism, ironically, in the
interest of perfecting democracy1 7
Let me turn next to Fineman's argument, which is, in large part,
an embrace of laissez-faire in "private life" so long as this does not
clash with certain feminist requirements. 38 Fineman would also
require more stringent regulation and control in economic life,
coupled with more state action to deal with the problems she
identifies as inconsistent with her understanding of equity. "Do your
own thing" is the tack Fineman takes when it comes to all matters of
what she construes as personal morality, so long as that morality is
somehow uncoerced.39 I am not sure what definition of coercion
Fineman is working with, but it is surely the case that no society
anywhere at anytime is free from coercion. The question is what sorts
of coercion and to what ends. Even Mahatma Gandhi described his
method of satygraha ("truth force") as a form of moral coercion. The
whole point was to force people to face certain unpleasant facts and
to compel a response. Somehow, in Fineman's reading of A Call to
Civil Society, a two-parent family is a coercive institution because it is
"regulated" by the state.40 But marriage and all forms of family life
are regulated in some ways. People cannot just do anything they
37. For a more thorough discussion on these matters, see generally JEAN BETHKE
ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT
(1992).
3& See generallyFineman, supra note 12.
39. See id. at 532-33.
40. Id. at 537.
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want. There is no bright line separating the uncoerced from the
coerced, particularly if you equate coercion with regulation.
Continuing, Fineman claims that the argument that "no-faultdivorce laws be reformed" is somehow a demand to move from
deregulated to regulated relationships. 41 Yet, who does Fineman
think passed no-fault legislation and set about enforcing it? States, of
course. So why is this not regulating divorce? To call for a reexamination of the no-fault mode, given its baneful unintended
consequences for women and children, is a call for a different form of
regulation, not for going from no regulation to "coercive" regulation.
Fineman seems to suggest that if she favors something, it is
noncoercive; if she opposes it, it is coercive. But the family -however
it is set up-is never a simply voluntary or unregulated institution.
The modern state reaches into all aspects of our lives. So this
distinction is a red herring.
To repeat: the question is not regulation or no regulation but
what forms of regulation and to what ends? What is to be
encouraged or discouraged? What behavior is to be rewarded or, in
some ways, inhibited? What is to be held up as exemplary and what
not? There is no society anywhere that does not regulate, encourage,
discourage, inhibit, reward. The question is how and to what ends.
A large chunk of Fineman's article is devoted to an attack on the
by now overwhelming burden of social scientific evidence concerning
the effects on children of growing up in single-parent households. As
counterevidence, Fineman cites a new study by Henry Ricciuti, Single
Parenthood and School Readiness in White, Black, and Hispanic 6and 7-Year-Olds.42 This, plus a first-person screed by Pepper
Schwartz: "How about man's inhumanity to woman? How about
thousands of years of female sacrifice unnoticed, almost
unmentioned? And how about the family as the primary institution
of women's subordination and oppression? ' 43 One wants to cry to
Schwartz: How about an argument rather than an ideological crise de
coeur? Fineman's last piece of support is a reference to Judith
Stacey's conspiracy theory about all those wily pro-family people who
somehow control the media, public policy and the like.44 This leads
41. Id.
42. See id. at 542 (citing Henry N. Ricciuti, Single Parenthood and School Readiness in
White, Black, and Hispanic6- and 7-Year-Olds, 13 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 450,459-63 (1999)).
43. Id. at 543 (quoting Pepper Schwartz, Gender and the Liberal Family, RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY, Spring 1991, at 86,87).
44. See id. at 542 (citing JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING
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her to aver that the criticisms of both "social scientists and feminists"
45
converge on the position with which she wholeheartedly agrees.
However, "social scientists" most emphatically do not agree with her
conclusion. The weight of the most solid evidence points entirely in
the other direction -as Fineman herself notes in a buried reference to
McLanahan and Sandefur's definitive work 6
Consider the Ricciuti essay, as that is the piece of "social
scientific" evidence on which Fineman relies. This essay
examined an extremely limited range of outcomes -vocabulary and
math test results and mother's reports of behavioral problemsaffecting the very young children (age 6-7) of mostly young, lowerincome, poorly educated mothers. These are severe, important
restrictions. The age limitation is especially problematic, since
many of the ill effects of growing up in a father-absent home only
show symptoms (especially symptoms clear enough to be detected
by crude social science instruments) after the child's seventh or
eighth birthday. Even if the study were competent, it could provide
no basis for the global assertion that "single '47parenthood seems to
have no effect on how a child does in school.
Ricciuti's study is also not competent on several other grounds.
For example:
Ricciuti crumbs his entire inquiry by playing fast and loose with the
definition of "single parent." If the unmarried mother has a live-in
boyfriend at the time the questionnaire was administered, Ricciuti
counts it as a two-parent home. That's quite a trick. Since many of
these young mothers have boyfriends, and since many of the
problems associated with unwed parenthood are made worse, not
better, by the presence of boyfriends in the home. Ricciuti can, in
one fell swoop, transfer much of the bad stuff that would have been
in column A over to column B.8
Additionally, argues Norval Glenn, one of the country's leading
sociologists of the family:
[T]he study should have distinguished between step-families and
families including both biological parents, because there is evidence
that the effects of the two kinds of families on some child outcomes
are typically different. Even more important, as Ricciuti admits,
just looking at family type as age 6 or 7, as was done in this study, is
not adequate. It is family history that is important. Consider that a
child who lived in a single-parent family for 6 years, but whose
FAMILY VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN AGE 59 (1996)).

45. Id. at 543.
46. See id. at 543 n.83 (citing SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP
WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS (1994)).

47. Propositions(Institute for American Values, New York, N.Y.), Fall 1999, at 3.
4& Id.
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mother recently married, is classified by Ricciuti as living in a twoparent home, while a child who lived for 6 years with both
biological parents who recently divorced is classified as living in a
single-parent home. These deficiencies in the definition and
variable make the findings of the
measurement of the independent
49
study essentially meaningless.

This, in sum, is the "social science evidence" on which Fineman
relies-a study that is, on the view of those who have devoted their
lives to studying this question, so flawed as to be "worthless."
Civil society proponents try to be tough-minded and realistic by
taking seriously the preponderant force of the evidence and by
looking at the world that is actually out there-where it is broken,
where people are suffering and children are languishing, and where
parents, especially single mothers, are overworked, exhausted and at
the end of their tethers. Fineman thinks that if the state (a state that
she also thinks is patriarchal) just "subsidized" women's choices, all
would be well. There is not a shred of evidence that this is the case.
There is no chance-not even the remotest-that a political coalition

could be put together to provide state subsidies in order to perpetuate
a situation that, according to those who have examined the issue
closely, is not only less than ideal, but also likely to yield results that
no decent society could accept as normative. By all means, support
all children, whatever the family situation. However, at the same
time, we should help to create the conditions that are, on all the best
available evidence, more optimal than others for child rearing.
To conclude with Fineman, she is right, I believe, to insist that
"growing inequality does have implications for civil society and
should be central in the debates."50 There is no space to take up (and
I am not, quite frankly, the most competent person to do it) the
question of just how rapidly we are getting to be a less egalitarian
society. Economically, I am convinced that we are and this is
enormously troubling. I have repeatedly addressed this question
elsewhere. Candidly, I wish we had spent more time on A Call to
Civil Society to address this matter. But, we were functioning as a
deliberative, political body, and in democratic and deliberative
politics, you do not always get everything you want. This is a hard
lesson for ideologues to learn for they always underestimate the
difficulties of going from abstract claims to empirical realities. Here,
however, are a few of the economic arguments we did make:
49. Id. at 4.
50. Fineman, supra note 12, at 545.
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Economic activities that weaken communities or assault the
integrity of childhood might not always reveal their ill-effects in the
short run, but the task of sustaining civil society requires a
disciplined commitment to the long run....
Wherever possible we urge employers to expand opportunities
available to employees for flexible workplace arrangements,
including tele-working, job sharing, compressed work weeks, career
breaks, job protection and other benefits for short term (up to six
months) parental leave, and job preferences and other benefits,
such as graduated re-entry, for long term (up to five years) parental
leave....
Even in strict economic terms, the companies that do best are often
those that do not treat their workers like replaceable commodities.
Regarding downsizing or replacing permanent employees with
independent contractors, temporary workers, or so-called permatemps, "tough-minded" often turns out to be weak-minded-an
example of bad civil society generating bad economics."
We also lift up trade unions as having the potential to play "an
important role in renewing civil society." 2 Not enough, agreed, but it
is not the case that economic matters were simply ignored.
To the third treatment, Professor Roberts believes that the
signers of A Call to Civil Society are duplicitous Santa Clauses
bringing coals rather than gifts to children. 3 Roberts practices the
hermeneutics of suspicion with such ardor that the "commitment to
freedom and justice for all"' in A Call to Civil Society is, she insists,
just a mask hiding a philosophy that is concerned with "rescuing a
5' 6
disappearing way of life,"55 one that is "exclusionary and regressive.
Civil society "revivalists" are also taxed with paying no attention to
racism 57 and with attributing our decline in morals to the success of
egalitarian movements. 58 We also champion "patriarchal norms"although I do not understand what is patriarchal about the dignity of
the human person.5 9 As well, our "understanding of morality
offends.., basic tenets of democratic civility," a rather elusive claim
that seems to turn on the notion that to assess some situations by
comparison to others as more beneficial for the upbringing of
51. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 7, at 24.

52. Id.
53. See Roberts, supra note 14, at 555.
54. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 7, at 3.
55. Roberts, supra note 14, at 555.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 556, 560.
5& See id. at 555.
59. See id. at 574-76.
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children is an uncivil act. °
Roberts specializes in stark dichotomies: one either makes an
economically deterministic argument (in which case moral and
cultural matters are merely epiphenomenal) or one fusses with the
froth (moral matters) and makes a flawed argument that egalitarian
issues are epiphenomenal. But why drive cultural, ethical and moral
questions, and economic and social questions apart in this way?
Roberts seems pinioned to a dualistic logic that fails to do justice to
the complexities and nuances of these matters, issues that William
Galston has addressed in great detail in his work as a political
philosopher.
I come in for some heavy fire because I "dismiss[] concerns
about social problems" 61 and because I am in the ranks of the
nostalgists (yet again) by attacking "progressives who stubbornly
refuse to relinquish their faith in federal government to solve social
problems. '62 This is simply not so. My critique has been against those
who yearn for a "Big Cause," for exciting "movement" politics rather
than the slow, patient building of social institutions over timeinstitutions that have some staying power. Here, I have been mightily
influenced by my connection to a democratic, participatory
community organizing under the auspices of the Industrial Areas
Foundation (of which I am a Board member). Ernesto Cortes, Jr.,
whenever he makes a presentation, speaks eloquently of helping
people to discover their "political-ness," to find within themselves
capacities for citizenship and action that require power in the service
of justice. 63 As Cortes and others insist: movements come and go, but
they are unstable. Only institutions have staying power. The
problem with the position Roberts represents is that it is implicitly
disdainful of the long, hard unglamorous work of building
communities of decency and justice, preferring the big slam dunk:
let's hit the streets, get the federal government to solve the problem,
and voila!
There are a number of tendentious claims that civil society
revivalists think it is "uncivil" for minorities to make demands for
equal citizenship. As a riposte, I suggest my Hard Questions article
60. Id. at 558.
61. Id. at 562.
62. Id. at 567.
63. The second edition of my book, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and
Political Thought, is dedicated to Cortes and the men and women of the Texas Interfaith
Coalition, the Industrial Areas Foundation Southwest coalition.
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for the New Republic, in which I endorse civil disobedience and insist
that it is vital to distinguish between robust political action and
criminality. 64 This column responded to those who claimed that the
Oklahoma City bombing was an instance of "incivility." 65 In the
article, I insisted that the bombing was a crime, an extreme
antipolitical act that kills argument rather than encouraging and
deepening it.6 I reminded readers that democratic politics is often
rowdy, "Frederick Douglass proclaimed that .those who want their
politics polite 'want rain without thunder and lightning."' 67 This does
not seem to me an argument against demands for equal treatment.
Bluntly, it is not a contribution to the discussion regarding civil
society to conclude an essay, as Roberts does, with the image of white
citizens of South Boston hurling curses at African-Americans during
the height of the judicially mandated school desegregation crisis.68 I
challenge Roberts to find anything in either A Call to Civil Society or
A Nation of Spectators that would hold such behavior up as
exemplary civil society political activity.
Of course, in a pluralistic, democratic society we cannot always
control the behavior of other people. Yet, we have faith in the
capacity of people for independent self-constitution, knowing that the
more robust the institutions and associations to which people belong,
the sturdier the individuals are and the more capable they will be of
the rough and tumble of politics.
I confess that I found reading several of the essays here collected
both challenging and enormously discouraging. Why discouraging?
Because it said to me that our universities seem to encourage a
peculiar tunnel vision in which arguments that have no relationship,
or the thinnest relationship, to the actual conditions are permitted to
fly forward like so many genies unleashed from bottles. They fly
forward unchallenged, encountering very little friction because they
are untethered to the actual conditions in which we find ourselveswe as a society, not we as privileged academics (although we are part
of it).
This, to me, is how a civil society proponent thinks: He or she
thinks we need to take stock; we need to try our best to glimpse
decent alternatives that remain within our civil reach; we need to
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Jean Bethke Elshtain, Hard Questions, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 1997, at 23.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See Roberts, supra note 14, at 580.
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create and to sustain ways of being that repudiate any and all
invidious distinctions between men and women and that, in so doing,
free us for love, service and citizenship rather than for fear,
resentment and anxiety. Surely, there is something profoundly
distorted about a culture prepared to send nursing mothers of sixweek-old infants into a war zone (as did the United States during the
Persian Gulf War, with some feminists embracing this sort of thing as
a great victory); that does not support parental leave in any generous
way; or that cuts children and parents adrift from the moment of
birth. There is also something distorted within a culture that makes
men and women (especially women) who want to stay home with
their infants feel guilty because they are not living out some
ideological ideal.
I have argued for a quarter of a century that the historic devotion
of women to families and communities was vital and important in
ways we only now are beginning to appreciate as women continue to
be drawn out more and more of families and communities (for good
and bad reasons) and into the paid labor force. The pity, surely, is
not that women historically did so much of the work of sustaining the
everyday world; rather, the pity is that this work was insufficiently
honored and recognized. Now, we (or all decent people, at least)
expect that men and women should both be involved with families,
children, and work. However, we arrange economic and social life in
such a way that families consistently get cheated.
Civil society proponents contend that we should evaluate culture
on the ground. What does it tell us about what kind of a people we
are or hope to become? I close with words from one of the great civil
society advocates, President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic,
from an address to the Parliament and Senate of the Czech Republic
delivered on December 9, 1997:
I have left culture to the end not because I consider it to be some
superstructural "icing on the cake," but for precisely the opposite
reason. I consider it the most important of all, something that
deserves to be mentioned at the very conclusion of my remarks....
I mean culture in the broadest sense of the word-that is, the
culture of human relationships, of human existence, of human
work, of human enterprise, of public and political life. I refer to the
general level of our culture ....
[Y]ou must know I am talking about what is called a civil society.
That means a society that makes room for the richest possible selfstructuring and the richest possible participation in public life. In
this sense, civil society is important for two reasons: in the first
place, it enables people to be themselves in all their dimensions,
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which includes being social creatures who desire, in thousands of
ways, to participate in the life of the community in which they live.
In the second place, it functions as a genuine guarantee of
political stability. The more developed all the organs, institutions,
and instruments of civil society are, the more resistant that society
will be to political upheavals or reversals. It was no accident that
communism's most brutal attack was aimed precisely against this
civil society. It knew very well that its greatest enemy was not an
individual non-Communist politician, but a society that was open,
structured independently
from the bottom up, and therefore very
69
difficult to manipulate.

69. Vaclav Havel, The Sad State of the Republic, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 5, 1998, at 42, 46.

